The Battle of the Little Bighorn — also known as Custer's Last Stand and Custer Massacre and, in the parlance of the relevant Native Americans, the Battle of the Greasy Grass — was an armed engagement between a Lakota-Northern Cheyenne combined force and the 7th Cavalry of the United States Army. It occurred June 25–June 26, 1876, near the Little Bighorn River in the eastern Montana Territory.
The battle was the most famous incident in the Indian Wars and was a victory for the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne. A U.S. cavalry detachment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer was annihilated.
Prelude to battle
The 7th Cavalry was a veteran organization created just after the American Civil War. Several men were veterans of the war, including many of the leading officers. A significant portion of the regiment had previously served four-and-a-half years at Ft. Riley, Kansas, during which time it fought one major engagement and numerous skirmishes, experiencing casualties of thirty-six killed and twenty-seven wounded. Six other troopers had died of drowning and fifty-one from cholera epidemics.
Half of the 7th Cavalry had just returned from eighteen months of constabulary duty in the deep South, having been recalled to Fort Abraham Lincoln to reassemble the regiment for the campaign. Approximately 20% of the troopers had been enlisted in the prior seven months (139 of an enlisted roll of 718), were only marginally trained, and had no combat or frontier experience. A sizable number of these recruits were immigrants from Ireland, England, and Prussia, just as many of the veteran troopers had been prior to their enlistments.
Of the 44 officers and 718 troopers then assigned to the 7th Cavalry (including a second lieutenant detached from the 20th Infantry and serving in L Troop), 13 officers (including the regimental commander, Col. Samuel D. Sturgis, who was on detached duty) and 152 troopers did not accompany the 7th during the campaign. Among those left behind at Fort Abraham Lincoln was the regimental band.
Following a night forced march on June 24–June 25, in which Crow Indian scouts reported to Custer the presence of what was judged a very large encampment of Indians, Custer divided the 7th Cavalry into four detachments:
Each of the first three detachments was to seek out the Indian encampments, attack them, and hold them in place until the other two detachments arrived to support. Custer had employed similar tactics in 1868 during the Battle of the Washita.
The largest detachment consisted of Troops C, E, F, I, and L, personally led by Custer. It numbered 13 officers, 198 men (7 of whom would eventually be detached before the "last stand") and 3 civilians—newspaper reporter Mark Kellogg and 2 scouts. Two of Custer's relatives later joined the column. Troop C was commanded by Custer's brother, Capt. Thomas Custer, and L Company by his brother-in-law, 1st Lt. James Calhoun. This detachment marched along a ridge line on the east bank of the Little Bighorn in an attempt to enter the encampment from the north.
A second detachment, led by Maj. Marcus Reno, was sent into the Little Bighorn valley to provoke an engagement. This detachment consisted of Troops A, G, and M, and numbered 11 officers, 131 troopers, and most of the approximately 35 Sioux, Ree/Arikara and Crow scouts.
A third detachment was led by a company commander, Capt. Frederick Benteen, and was made up of Troops D, H, and K, with 5 officers and 110 men. Its mission is controversial, with some analysts arguing it was simply to scout nearby valleys while others believe he was intended to find and enter the Little Big Horn Valley and sweep up towards the village. He was ordered to attack any body of Indians he encountered despite being out of supporting distance from the rest of the command.
The last group was the regimental pack train, consisting of 7 or 8 troopers from each company and escorted by Troop B. Commanded by Capt. Thomas McDougall, this sizable force had 2 officers, 127 troopers, and 7 civilian packers. 7th Cavalry organization and deployment
Battle
The first detachment to attack was Major Reno's, conducted after receiving orders from Custer issued by Lt. William W. Cooke. The orders, made without accurate knowledge of the village's size, location, or propensity to stand and fight, were to pursue the Indians and "bring them to battle". However, Custer did promise to "support...[Reno] with the whole outfit". Reno's force crossed the Little Bighorn at the mouth of what is today called Reno Creek and immediately realized that the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne were present "in force and ...not running away".
Sending a message to Custer, but hearing nothing in return, Reno advanced rapidly northward, stating that he drove the enemy "with ease". However, he suspected "a trap" and stopped a few hundred yards short of the encampment, dismounting and deploying in a skirmish line, as standard army doctrine called for. In deploying in a skirmish line, every fifth trooper handled the horses for four troopers taking firing positions, thus immediately reducing the fighting force by 20%. The troopers on the skirmish line were positioned five to ten yards apart, with officers just to their rear and the troopers with horses behind the officers. After about 20 minutes of long distance firing he had taken only one casualty but the odds against him had become more obvious (Reno estimated five to one) and Custer had not reinforced him. Reno ordered a withdrawal into nearby woods in a loop of the river, then made a disorderly retreat across the river to reach the high ground of the bluffs on the other side. The retreat was confused and immediately disrupted by Cheyenne attacks at close quarters. Reno later reported that 3 officers and 29 troopers were killed during the retreat and the subsequent fording of the river and another officer and 13-18 men missing, left behind in the woods, although most of these men eventually rejoined the detachment.
Atop the bluffs, Reno's shaken troops soon linked up with the detachment of Captain Benteen, arriving from the south. This force had been on its lateral scouting mission when it had been summoned by a messenger from Custer to "Come on...big village, be quick...bring pacs...". (This messenger was John Martin, a trumpeter, who was the last white person to see Custer alive and survive the battle.) Benteen's coincidental arrival on the bluffs was just in time to save Reno's men from possible annihilation. Their detachments were then reinforced by McDougall and the pack train. The 14 officers and 340 troopers on the bluffs organized an all-around defense and dug rifle pits.
Despite hearing heavy gunfire from the north, Benteen concentrated on reinforcing Reno's badly wounded battalion, rather than continuing on toward Custer. After an hour, nearing five o'clock and the end of the Custer fight, Capt. Thomas Weir and Company D moved out against orders to make contact with Custer. They advanced a mile and could see Lakota shooting in the distance, but were under considerable pressure themselves. The other companies eventually followed by assigned battalions, first Benteen, then Reno, and finally the pack train, but growing Lakota attacks forced all seven companies to return to the bluff before the pack train, with the ammunition, had moved even a quarter mile. Benteen's apparent reluctance prompted later criticism that he had failed to follow orders.
Reno's attack
The gunfire heard on the bluffs was from Custer's fight. His force of 208 was engaged by the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne approximately 3.5 miles (6 km) to the north. Having driven Reno's force away from the encampment and isolated it, many warriors were free to pursue Custer. The route taken by Custer to his "Last Stand" remains a subject of debate. It does seem clear that after ordering Reno to charge, Custer continued down Reno Creek to within about a half mile (800 m) of the Little Bighorn, but then turned north, and climbed up the bluffs, reaching the same spot to which Reno would soon retreat. From this point, he could see Reno, on the other side of the river, charging the village.
Custer then rode north along the bluffs, and descended into a drainage called Medicine Tail Coulee, which led to the river. Some historians believe that part of Custer's force descended the coulee, going west to the river and attempting unsuccessfully to cross into the village. Other authorities believe that Custer never approached the river, but rather continued north across the coulee and up the other side, where he gradually came under attack. According to this theory, by the time Custer realized he was badly outnumbered by the Indians who came from the Reno fight, it was too late to break back through to the south, where Reno and Benteen could have provided reinforcement.
Within less than 30 minutes,
The terrain of the battlefield gave Lakota and Cheyenne bows an advantage, since Custer's troops were pinned in a depression on higher ground from which they could not use direct fire at the Indians in defilade. On the other hand, the Lakota and Cheyenne were able to shoot their arrows into the depression by launching them on a high arching indirect fire, with the volume of arrows ensuring severe casualties. U.S. small arms might have been more accurate over open distances, but the fighting on this occasion was close combat where rate of fire and reliability of a weapon were more important attributes.
Custer's fight
Recent archaeological work at the battlefield site indicates that Custer initially deployed his troops in skirmish lines per Army doctrine. This deployment would have resulted in only approximately 150 troopers providing defensive fire over several long skirmish lines. As individual troopers were killed, wounded or their carbines jammed, the skirmish lines became untenable.
Custer's resistance
After the Custer force was annihilated, the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne regrouped to attack Reno and Benteen. The fight continued until dark (approximately 9:00 p.m. by local timekeeping) and for much of the next day, with the outcome in doubt. Reno credited Benteen's leadership with repulsing a severe attack on the portion of the perimeter held by Companies H and M.
By July, the 7th cavalry had been restocked with officers and new recruiting efforts were underway. It would again take the field in pursuit of its adversaries, but its legacy remains the Little Bighorn.
For further details on participants and casualties, see below.
The aftermath
In 1878, the army awarded 24 Medals of Honor to participants in the fight on the bluffs for bravery, most for risking their lives to carry water from the river up the hill to the wounded. Few questioned the conduct of the enlisted men, but many questioned the tactics, strategy, and conduct of the officers.
After the battle
The battle was the subject of an army Court of Inquiry, made at Reno's request, in 1879 in Chicago, in which Reno's conduct was scrutinized. Some testimony was presented suggesting that he was drunk and a coward, but since none of this came from army officers, Reno's conduct was found to be without fault. However, Lieutenant Jesse Lee, Reno Court of Inquiry transcriber, wrote the following letter to General Miles, who was accusing Reno and Benteen of betrayal:
In spite of this, however, Custer's legend was embedded in the American imagination as a heroic officer fighting valiantly against savage forces, an image popularized in Wild West extravaganzas hosted by showman "Buffalo Bill" Cody, Pawnee Bill, and others.
By the end of the 20th century, the general recognition of the mistreatment of the various Indian tribes in the conquest of the American West, and the perception of Custer's role in it, have changed the image of the battle and of Custer. The Little Bighorn is now viewed by some as a confrontation between relentless U.S. westward expansion and warriors defending their land and way of life.
The Reno Court of Inquiry, and the accusations of betrayal and cowardice
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